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Abstract
In a framework allowing inﬁnitely many individuals, I prove that
coalitionally strategyproof social choice functions satisfy “tops only.”
That is, they depend only on which alternative each individual prefers
the most, not on which alternative she prefers the second most, the
third, ..., or the least. The functions are deﬁned on the domain of
proﬁles measurable with respect to a Boolean algebra of coalitions.
The unrestricted domain of proﬁles is an example of such a domain. I
also prove an extension theorem.
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11 Introduction
Pazner and Wesley [14] showed that when there are inﬁnitely many individ-
uals, there exists a nondictatorial, coalitionally strategyproof social choice
function on the unrestricted domain of proﬁles of individual preferences.
In their proof, using a non-constructive mathematical technique (the ex-
istence of a free ultraﬁlter over an arbitrary inﬁnite set), they deﬁned a
nondictatorial function and showed that it is coalitionally strategyproof.
In Mihara [11], I proved the same result for countably inﬁnite societies; I
did so by constructing a concrete example of a nondictatorial, coalitionally
strategyproof social choice function. The functions that these authors de-
ﬁned satisfy the property (called “tops only”) that only the most-preferred
alternatives of individuals matter: the functions depend only on which alter-
native each individual prefers the most, not on which alternative she prefers
the second most, the third, ..., or the least.
While the property of “tops only” may be desirable in terms of informa-
tional simplicity, it may not be necessarily so in other aspects. For example,
suppose that the set of individuals consists of all natural numbers and that
the set of alternatives consists of three elements a, b, and c. Suppose that
all even-numbered individuals prefer a to the other two, and that all odd-
numbered individuals prefer b to the other two. In such a case, to choose
one alternative from among the three, the planner might want to base her
choice on each individual’s worst alternative: if for example a is the least-
preferred alternative of signiﬁcantly many individuals but b is not, then she
might want to choose b in this case.
The main goal of this paper is to see whether the “tops only” property
is necessary for coalitional strategyproofness. The answer is yes. Proposi-
tion 1 establishes in a very general framework that when there are inﬁnitely
many individuals, every coalitionally strategyproof function satisﬁes “tops
only.” (Example 1 shows that coalitional strategyproofness in the propo-
sition cannot be replaced by individual strategyproofness.) On the other
hand, when there are only ﬁnitely many individuals, then a coalitionally
(actually, individually) strategyproof function is necessarily dictatorial, ac-
cording to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [7, 15]. Hence the property
is trivially satisﬁed since such functions must choose the best alternative of
the dictator.
The ﬁrst proof of Proposition 1 goes as follows: Given are two preference
proﬁles p and p0 that are “top equivalent” (1). This means that for each
alternative, the coalition that prefers it the most at p is the same as that
at p0. Partition the set of individuals into classes so that those in the
2same class have an identical preference at p and another identical preference
at p0. The partition is ﬁnite since the set of alternatives (hence the set
of preferences) is ﬁnite. Treat each class as an individual and apply the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to ﬁnd a dictatorial class. What this class
prefers the most at p is what it prefers the most at p0.
In the context of provision of public goods, several authors show the
proposition that individually strategyproof functions satisfy “tops only.”
They do so by restricting preferences to those satisfying a generalized “single-
peakedness” condition or the related condition of “separability.” For exam-
ple, Barber` a and Jackson [4, Theorem 1] show a variant of the proposition
for the case of a public good, available at diﬀerent levels expressed as a
real number. Barber` a, Sonnenschein, and Zhou [5, pp. 601–2] give another
variant for the case of one or more public goods, each available at two levels
(“accept” or “reject”). Finally, Barber` a, Gul, and Stacchetti [3, Theorem 1]
prove the proposition for one or more public goods, each available at a ﬁnite
number of diﬀerent levels. All these papers consider ﬁnite sets of individuals.
In contrast to those papers, this paper considers an abstract social choice
setting and allows the unrestricted domain of proﬁles. It also sticks to the
unmodiﬁed notion of coalitional strategyproofness. One reason for doing
that is that there are some contexts in which neither restriction on pro-
ﬁles nor modiﬁcations (such as introducing “counter-threats” [13] by non-
members of the manipulating coalition) of the notion make much sense. For
instance, it often happens in the political arena that all alternatives for a
voting are so similar that no voter outside can (bother to) predict what coali-
tion, if any, is secretly forming. No preference can be ruled out in advance,
and no “counter-threats” are likely to be realized there. Another reason is
that it is natural to begin our investigation with a simple setting—the unre-
stricted domain and the unmodiﬁed notion of coalitional strategyproofness.
(As I discussed above, however, investigations of restricted domains have
preceded the present one.)
I investigate the case of inﬁnitely many individuals. (Mihara [10, 11]
gives an interpretation of an inﬁnite society of individuals. See also Re-
mark 2.) That is the only case in which the question of ﬁnding a coalitionally
strategyproof function violating “tops only” is interesting, since I allow the
unrestricted domain and stick to the unmodiﬁed notion of coalitional strat-
egyproofness. The case of ﬁnitely many individuals is trivially answered by
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [7, 15].
The functions in this paper are deﬁned on the domain of proﬁles mea-
3surable [1] with respect to a Boolean algebra. These are the proﬁles such
that for each pair of alternatives x and y, the coalition of individuals that
prefer x to y is “observable.” (Which coalitions are “observable” depends on
the choice of a Boolean algebra. If the Boolean algebra is chosen so that all
coalitions are “observable,” then I have, as a special case, the unrestricted
domain.) But if a social choice function satisﬁes “tops only,” why should
one care about observability of all those coalitions, many of which are ir-
relevant? This suggests extending the domain. Applying the main result, I
show (Proposition 2) that any coalitionally strategyproof social choice func-
tion on the domain of measurable proﬁles can be extended to a coalitionally
strategyproof social choice function on the larger domain of “admissible”
proﬁles [11].
2 Framework
The framework is adapted from that of Armstrong [1, 2] for Arrow’s social
welfare functions. (Armstrong’s framework has found application in my
studies [10, 9, 12] of aspects of information processing in social choice. It has
also found application in studies [6] of “describable” social welfare functions.)
Let I be an inﬁnite set of individuals. Let X be a ﬁnite set of alternatives,
which has at least three elements. Let S be the set of (strict) preferences,
i.e., total (if x 6= y, then either x Â y or y Â x), asymmetric (x Â y implies
that y Â x is false), and transitive binary relations Â on X. (For simplicity,
indiﬀerence is not allowed.)
Let B be a Boolean algebra consisting of subsets of I. By deﬁnition, it
satisﬁes the following: (i) ∅, I ∈ B; (ii) A ∪ B, A ∩ B, Ac ∈ B if A, B ∈ B
(where Ac denotes the complement of A). Intuitively, an element of the
Boolean algebra is a coalition observable to the planner.
Remark 1. Under a diﬀerent interpretation, the case of ﬁnitely many in-
dividuals can be incorporated into the present framework. For this purpose,
consider a ﬁnite partition of I and consider the Boolean algebra consist-
ing of all unions of elements in the partition, and reinterpret each partition
element as an “individual.” k
A proﬁle is a list p = (Â
p
i )i∈I ∈ SI of individual preferences Â
p
i , for i ∈ I.
A proﬁle (Â
p
i )i∈I is B-measurable if {i ∈ I : x Â
p
i y } ∈ B for all x, y ∈ X.
Denote by SI
B the set of all B-measurable proﬁles. A B-social choice function
is a function g from SI
B onto X. (The assumption that it is onto is usually
included in the statement of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, ruling out
4uninteresting strategyproof functions such as constant ones. The assump-
tion will be used almost everywhere I resort to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem. Remark 3 shows that the assumption is indispensable.) For a
preference Â, denote by max Â the greatest (maximal) element of X with
respect to Â. A proﬁle (Â
p
i )i∈I is B-admissible if {i ∈ I : x = max Â
p
i } ∈ B
for all x ∈ X. Denote by SI(B) the set of all B-admissible proﬁles. (Note
that when X is ﬁnite, SI
B ⊆ SI(B).) A (B)-social choice function is a func-
tion G from SI(B) onto X. I say two proﬁles p = (Â
p
i )i∈I and p0 = (Â
p0
i )i∈I
are top equivalent (p ' p0) if
{i ∈ I : x = max Â
p
i } = {i ∈ I : x = max Â
p0
i } (1)
for all x ∈ X.
Let g be a B-social choice function. A coalition E can manipulate g at
a proﬁle p = (Â
p
i )i∈I by reporting another proﬁle p0 = (Â
p0





for all i / ∈ E and g(p0) Â
p
i g(p) for all i ∈ E. g is said to be coalitionally
manipulable if for some B-measurable proﬁles p, p0 and for some nonempty
coalition E ⊆ I, E can manipulate g at p by reporting p0. g is coali-
tionally strategyproof if it is not coalitionally manipulable. Coalitionally
strategyproof (B)-social choice functions are deﬁned similarly; in this case,
only admissibility is required of the proﬁles p and p0.
Remark 2. For B-social choice functions, restricting the manipulating
coalitions to those in B will not alter the notion of strategyproofness: If E
can manipulate g at p by reporting p0, then
E0 = {i ∈ I : g(p0) Â
p
i g(p)} ∈ B
can manipulate g at p by reporting p0. k
g is said to be individually manipulable if for some B-measurable proﬁles
p, p0 and for some one-individual coalition {i} ⊆ I, {i} can manipulate g
at p by reporting p0. g is individually strategyproof if it is not individually
manipulable.
Let Q ⊆ SI
B. A coalition S dictates the proﬁles in Q if for all p ∈ Q and
for all x ∈ X, whenever x is most preferred by all individuals in S, g(p) = x.
3 The main result
I begin with an example of an individually strategyproof social choice func-
tion (on the unrestricted domain) that violates “tops only.” Though the
function is obviously nondictatorial, it is not coalitionally strategyproof.
5Example 1. Let I = N, the set of natural numbers. Let X = {a,b,c},
where a is indexed by 1, b by 2, and c by 3. For each x ∈ X and each







sets of individuals that prefer x the most, second most, and the least (at
proﬁle p) respectively. Deﬁne a social choice function g as follows: (i) if
there is exactly one x such that r
p
1(x) is inﬁnite and r
p
3(x) is ﬁnite, then
let g(p) = x; (ii) otherwise, let g(p) be the ﬁrst-indexed x such that r
p
1(x)
is inﬁnite. (The case (i) means that the following condition is satisﬁed by
only one x: inﬁnitely many individuals rank x ﬁrst, and only ﬁnitely many
individuals rank x third. For example, if all but ﬁnitely many individuals
rank x ﬁrst, the condition is satisﬁed. If ﬁnitely many individuals rank x
ﬁrst and all the others rank x second, the condition is violated.)
It is easy to see that the function is individually strategyproof: If p
and p0 are diﬀerent with respect to only one individual’s preference, then
g(p) = g(p0) since ﬁniteness and inﬁniteness of the set of individuals that
rank an alternative ﬁrst (second, third) are unaﬀected. No individual can
thus manipulate g by reporting p0 at p.
To see that the function violates “tops only,” and that it is not coali-
tionally strategyproof, consider the following proﬁle. All even-numbered
individuals rank a ﬁrst, b second, and c third; all odd-numbered individ-
uals rank b ﬁrst, a second, and c third. In this case, g assigns a to the
proﬁle (case (ii) above applies). Now suppose that all the odd-numbered
individuals report that they rank b ﬁrst, c second, and a third. (Note that
the ﬁrst-ranked alternative is the same as before.) Then, g assigns b to the
reported proﬁle (case (i) above applies). But b is the alternative that the
odd-numbered individuals prefer the most. They can thereby manipulate
the function. k
On the other hand, if coalitional strategyproofness is required, no social
choice function violates “tops only”:
Proposition 1 Suppose that g:SI
B → X is a coalitionally strategyproof B-
social choice function. Then for any B-measurable proﬁles p and p0 that are
top equivalent (i.e., p ' p0; see (1) above), we have g(p) = g(p0).
Proof. Suppose that g, p, and p0 satisfy the assumptions. Partition




j } (where j ranges
over I) so that all individuals in the same coalition have the same preference
at p. Since X is ﬁnite, there are only ﬁnitely many possible preferences.
Hence the partition {Cj : j ∈ I } is ﬁnite. For proﬁle p0, partition the set I
6into coalitions C0




k } (where k ranges over I) in a similar
way.
From these partitions, form the reﬁnement
{Cj ∩ C0
k : j,k ∈ I },
which is also a partition of I. Note that the individuals belonging to the
same partition element Cj ∩ C0
k have an identical preference at p. Likewise
they have an identical preference at p0.
Now, consider the class of proﬁles q such that for each j and k in I, all
individuals within the same coalition Cj ∩ C0
k have an identical preference
at q. In particular, p and p0 belong to this class of proﬁles. Regarding each
of these (ﬁnitely many) coalitions as an “individual,” we can obviously derive
from g a social choice function for ﬁnitely many individuals, which becomes
individually strategyproof. Then the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for
ﬁnitely many individuals implies that one of the coalitions—say, Cj0 ∩C0
k0—
dictates the proﬁles in the class.
The members of this dictatorial coalition Cj0 ∩ C0
k0 prefer a certain x
the most at p (that is, if Cj0 ∩ C0
k0 ⊆ {i ∈ I : x = max Â
p
i }). We thus
have g(p) = x. But since p and p0 are top equivalent, the same coalition
members prefer x the most at p0 (that is, Cj0 ∩ C0
k0 ⊆ {i : x = max Â
p0
i }),
with the result that g(p0) = x.
Remark 3. One might be tempted to modify the proof by considering
the partition consisting of the coalitions of individuals having the same max-
imal element, instead of the same preference. Such an argument does not
work since a coalition cannot be identiﬁed with an “individual” unless the
members have the same preference. k
I now give an alternative proof, using Lemma 1 below. The lemma, which
will be used again in an alternative proof of the extension theorem (Propo-
sition 2) later, is of some interest in itself, as its corollary (Proposition 4)
illustrates.
Before stating the lemma, I introduce two deﬁnitions: A ﬁlter F on the
Boolean algebra B is a collection of sets in B satisfying: (i) ∅ / ∈ F; (ii) if
A ∈ F and A ⊆ B, then B ∈ F; (iii) if A, B ∈ F, then A ∩ B ∈ F. We
may think of a ﬁlter as a collection of “large” sets. An ultraﬁlter is a ﬁlter
U that satisﬁes (iv): if A / ∈ U, then Ac ∈ U.
7Lemma 1 Suppose that g:SI
B → X is a coalitionally strategyproof B-social
choice function. Let Wg be the set of all winning coalitions: S ∈ Wg iﬀ
S ∈ B dictates the proﬁles in SI
B. Then Wg is an ultraﬁlter on B.
Remark 4. Recall that the social choice function is onto by deﬁnition.
It is easy to see that the assumption is necessary for the conclusion of the
lemma. If g is not onto, then the set Wg of winning coalitions is empty.
Then Wg cannot be an ultraﬁlter. k
The lemma extends Corollary 7.1 of Ishikawa and Nakamura [8]. They
showed the result for social choice functions on the speciﬁc domain where
every proﬁle is measurable. Their indirect proof using a result for simple
games, essentially applies to my lemma. Accordingly, I give a diﬀerent proof
below (after the proof of the main result). Like the above proof of Proposi-
tion 1, the proof of the lemma uses the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for
ﬁnitely many individuals. The proof of the lemma is more complex, how-
ever. In the proof of the proposition, deriving in one step that a certain
coalition dictates a certain restricted class of proﬁles was enough. In the
proof of the lemma, it is shown (item (iii) and (iv)) in several steps that a
certain coalition dictates successively larger classes of proﬁles.
Alternative Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that g, p, and p0 satisfy
the assumptions. Then (by a well-known property of an ultraﬁlter) exactly
one of the partition elements {i ∈ I : x = max Â
p
i }, where x ranges
over the ﬁnite X, belongs to the ultraﬁlter Wg (of Lemma 1). Assume
{i ∈ I : x = max Â
p
i } ∈ Wg for a particular x. Then since p and p0 are top
equivalent (see (1) above), we have {i ∈ I : x = max Â
p0
i } ∈ Wg. By the
deﬁnition of Wg it follows from these two that g(p) = x and g(p0) = x.
Proof of Lemma 1. We check the four properties that deﬁnes an ultra-
ﬁlter.
(i) Suppose ∅ ∈ Wg. Then for all p and x, g(p) = x, which is impossible
since X has at least three elements.
(ii) Obvious.
(iii) Suppose A, B ∈ Wg. Let C = A ∩ B. We show C ∈ Wg. Con-
sider four disjoint coalitions C, A \ B, B \ A, and (A ∪ B)c. Consider the
proﬁles such that all individuals within the same coalition have an identical
preference. Regarding each of these four coalitions as an “individual,” we
can obviously derive from g a social choice function for four individuals,
8which becomes individually strategyproof. Then the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem for ﬁnitely many individuals implies that one of the four coalitions
dictates these proﬁles. We show in three steps that C dictates successively
larger classes of proﬁles.
We ﬁrst claim that C dictates the proﬁles described in the previous
paragraph. To see this, Suppose for example A \ B dictates these proﬁles.
But since B ∈ Wg, B dictates these proﬁles in particular. So, we have two
disjoint dictatorial coalitions, which is a contradiction. Hence A\B cannot
dictate these proﬁles. Similarly, B\A cannot dictate. Also, (A∪B)c cannot
dictate since A ∪ B ∈ Wg by (ii) above.
Next, we show that C dictates those proﬁles such that diﬀerent indi-
viduals belonging to the same one of the three other coalitions may have
diﬀerent preferences but all individuals in C must have an identical pref-
erence. Consider a proﬁle p such that all individuals in C have the same
preference preferring an a the most and all individuals in the same coali-
tion other than C have the same preferences preferring a the least. Since C
dictates this proﬁle, g(p) = a. Now suppose for a particular proﬁle p0, all
individuals in C have the same preferences as in p (hence they prefer a the
most) but g(p0) 6= a. Then at p, Cc can manipulate g by reporting p0.
To conclude that C ∈ Wg (that is, C dictates all proﬁles in the do-
main SI
B), suppose that for a p such that individuals in C prefer an a the
most (but otherwise may have diﬀerent preferences), g(p) 6= a. Consider
a p0 such that all individuals in C have an identical preference preferring a
the most and individuals not in C have the same preferences as in p. From
what has been shown above, g(p0) = a. Then at p, C can manipulate g by
reporting p0.
(iv) Suppose A / ∈ Wg and A ∈ B. We must show Ac ∈ Wg. The proof is
similar to (iii). Deﬁning a similar social choice function for two individuals,
we see either A or C = Ac dictates the restricted proﬁles. If C dictates the
proﬁles, then C ∈ Wg as we showed above. If A dictates the proﬁles, then
A ∈ Wg, contradicting the assumption.
4 Extension theorem
I deﬁned a B-social choice function on the domain SI
B of B-measurable
proﬁles p. The measurability condition requires that the coalitions {i ∈
I : x Â
p
i y } that prefer x to y be “observable,” for all x and y in X.
(Here I am taking the “observability” interpretation as given: “observable”
equals “belonging to the Boolean algebra.” Questioning the interpreta-
9tion would require specifying a particular Boolean algebra, as I did else-
where [10, 12].) Proposition 1, however, implies that a coalitionally strat-
egyproof function uses the information about those coalitions of the form
{i ∈ I : x = max Â
p
i } only, ignoring some of the coalitions {i ∈ I : x Â
p
i y }.
But if a coalition {i ∈ I : x Â
p
i y } is ignored (irrelevant), requiring it to be
“observable” seems too demanding from the informational viewpoint (con-
sider the cognitive burden of the planner).
The following extension theorem states that (i) the function is in fact
extendable to the domain SI(B) of admissible proﬁles, which domain does
not require the irrelevant coalitions to be “observable” and (ii) the exten-
sion is also coalitionally strategyproof. Note that coalitional manipulability
in a larger domain does not generally imply coalitional manipulability in
a smaller domain. Thus the key to the proof is in suitably constructing
proﬁles q and q0 in the smaller domain such that a certain coalition can
manipulate g at q by reporting q0.
Proposition 2 Suppose that g:SI
B → X is a coalitionally strategyproof B-
social choice function. Then g can be extended to a coalitionally strategyproof
(B)-social choice function G:SI(B) → X.
Proof. Given a g satisfying the assumption, deﬁne G by
G(p) = g(q)
for all p ∈ SI(B), where q is an arbitrary proﬁle in SI
B that is top equivalent
to p (i.e., q ' p). (The existence of such a q will become evident later.)
Note that G is well-deﬁned since Proposition 1 implies that if q ' p and
q0 ' p (hence q ' q0), then g(q) = g(q0).
Now, to show that G is coalitionally strategyproof, suppose that it is
coalitionally manipulable. Then there exist p, p0 ∈ SI(B) and nonempty




i for all i / ∈ E and, (b) G(p0) Â
p
i G(p) for all
i ∈ E.
Fix an arbitrary preference Â (the “prototype order”). We obtain the
q from the “prototype order” Â by pushing up maximal elements and by
pushing down the nonmaximal G(p) at p as follows: for each i and for




(i) If x = max Â
p
i , push x up to the top to get Ri (i.e, for all y, z ∈ X
diﬀerent from x, xRiy, and yRiz ⇐⇒ y Â z).
(ii) If G(p) 6= max Â
p
i , push G(p) down to the bottom to get Â
q
i .
Since all individuals having the same maximal element at p have an identical
10preference at q, we have q ∈ SI
B and q ' p. Similarly, we can obtain the
q0 ∈ SI
B from Â by pushing up maximal elements and by pushing down the
nonmaximal G(p) at p0 such that q0 ' p0.





i are identical, except possibly for the maximal element
and for the least element. But since q and q0 are obtained by pushing up
maximal elements at p and at p0 (and by pushing down the nonmaximal






Let i ∈ E. Since G(p) 6= max Â
p
i by (b) above, G(p) is the least element
with respect to Â
q
i . But G(p) = g(q) since q ' p and q ∈ SI
B. Hence g(q)
is the least element with respect to Â
q
i . But since g(q0) 6= g(q) (because
g(q0) = G(p0) 6= G(p) = g(q)), it follows that g(q0) Â
q
i g(q).
We have established in the preceding two paragraphs that g is coalition-
ally manipulable, contrary to the assumption.
Corollary 3 Suppose that g:SI
B → X is a nondictatorial, coalitionally strat-
egyproof B-social choice function. Then g can be extended to a nondictato-
rial, coalitionally strategyproof (B)-social choice function G:SI(B) → X.
Proof. If an extension of a social choice function g is dictatorial, then so
is g.
I conclude the paper with a sketch of an alternative proof of the extension
theorem (Proposition 2). The proof uses the following proposition, which
is immediate from Lemma 1. The proposition characterizes the graph of a
coalitionally strategyproof B-social choice function, whose domain consists
of the measurable proﬁles of strict preferences.
Proposition 4 Suppose that g:SI
B → X is a coalitionally strategyproof B-
social choice function. Then there exists an ultraﬁlter Wg on B such that
for all p = (Â
p
i )i∈I ∈ SI
B and for all x ∈ X,
g(p) = x ⇐⇒ {i ∈ I : x = max Â
p
i } ∈ Wg.
To prove the extension theorem using this proposition, deﬁne G from
SI(B) to X by
G(p) = x ⇐⇒ {i ∈ I : x = max Â
p
i } ∈ Wg.
11By a property of an ultraﬁlter, it is easy to see that G is a well-deﬁned
(B)-social choice function extending g. To prove that G is coalitionally
strategyproof, use the argument that Pazner and Wesley [14, p.255] give in
the second paragraph of the proof of their Theorem.
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